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Modelling the constraints on consanguineous marriage when fertility 
declines 
Bilal Barakat
1
 
Stuart Basten
2
 
Abstract 
BACKGROUND  
Consanguinity - or marriage between close blood relatives, in particular first cousins - is 
widely practised and even socially encouraged in many countries. However, in the face 
of fertility transition where the number of cousins eligible to marry declines, how might 
such constraints on consanguinity develop in the future?  
 
OBJECTIVE  
Numerous studies have stated that the practice cannot continue at present levels and in 
its present form in the face of fertility transition. However, the future impact of fertility 
transition on availability of cousins to marry has not yet been quantified. 
 
METHODS  
We perform a simulation exercise using past and projected net reproduction rates 
(NRRs) derived from the UN. We calculate the average number of cousins of the 
opposite sex as a function of the average number of children, the average probability of 
an individual having at least one eligible paternal cousin of the opposite sex, and 
conclude with an examination of constraints on consanguineous marriage in selected 
countries under different fertility assumptions.  
 
RESULTS  
Current and projected fertility levels in Middle Eastern countries will create challenging 
constraints on the custom once today's birth cohorts reach marriageable age.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Either consanguinity prevalence will diminish significantly, or the institution will be 
forced to adapt by becoming more coercive in the face of reduced choice or at the 
expense of other social preferences (such as for an older groom wedding a younger 
bride). Fertility decline affects prospects for social change not only through its well-
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known consequences for mothers but also through shaping marriage conditions for the 
next generation. 
 
 
 
1. Background 
1.1 Defining consanguinity 
In terms of clinical genetics, a consanguineous marriage is defined as a union between 
two individuals who are related as second cousins or closer (Hamamy 2012). The 
inbreeding coefficient, F=0.0156, represents the probability of an individual having a 
pair of alleles that are identical by descent (Hartl and Clark 1989: 236). As such, second 
cousins – or a couple whose grandparents were siblings – would have an inbreeding 
coefficient of 0.0156 (see Figure 1). Figure 1 shows six of the most common types of 
consanguineous marriage. First cousin marriage, one of the most widespread forms of 
consanguineous marriage, has an inbreeding coefficient of F=0.0625. Hamamy et al. 
(2011) observe a practice in some Arab communities to marry double first cousins, and 
in South India uncle-niece marriages are not uncommon. In each of these cases the 
inbreeding coefficient reaches F=0.125. However, it should be noted that in populations 
with a high degree of consanguinity so-called „complex consanguinity loops‟ can arise 
from successive generations of cousin marriage which can lead to even higher 
inbreeding coefficients. 
„Inbreeding‟, particularly over numerous generations, has been widely reported to 
have negative implications for childhood mortality and morbidity (Jurdi and Saxena 
2003, Bittles 2001). While it is often difficult to isolate the consanguinity-related 
genetic impact from other socio-demographic factors, mortality differentials of high 
statistical significance have been confirmed using meta-analysis (Bittles and Black 
2010a).  
Both sacred and secular boundaries are set with regard to consanguineous 
marriages across the world. First cousin marriage is, for example, proscribed by the 
Greek and Russian Orthodox Church and within Sikhism (Bittles and Black 2010b). In 
the civil code, however, only a handful of countries proscribe cousin marriage. China 
prohibited first-cousins marriage in the 1981 Marriage Law (with some exceptions for 
ethnic groups) while North Korea banned marriage between blood relatives up to third 
cousin under the auspices of the 1994 Family Law (Bittles and Black 2010b).
3
 Finally, 
                                                          
3 In the case of China, however, Wang et al. (2002) observe that the family planning restrictions in place, and 
hence the low fertility prevalent especially in urban centres, had effectively reduced the potential number of 
marriageable first cousins. 
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first cousin marriage is illegal in 31 of the 50 states of the US (Ottenheimer 1996, Paul 
and Spencer 2008, Bittles and Black 2010b).  
 
Figure 1: Categories of consanguineous marriage  
 
Source: adapted from Hamamy 2012 
 
 
Consanguineous marriages are widely practised and even socially encouraged 
across the Middle East and North African countries, as well as in South Asia and 
among immigrant and specific religious groups elsewhere (Darr and Modell 1988, 
Bittles 2003). Recently collected sample prevalence rates in the different regions of 
these countries include 23%-78% in Iran (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2008), 25%-50% in 
Iraq (COSIT 2005), 15%-63% in Syria (Othman and Saadat 2009), 15%-39% in Turkey 
(Koc 2008), and 25%-55% in Egypt (Khayat and Saxena 2005). Rates of around 40%-
60% have also been reported in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Tunisia, and Yemen 
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(Khayat and Saxena 2005). Furthermore, anthropological evidence from Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South East Asia suggests high prevalence rates that the lack of quantitative 
data is unable to document (Bittles and Black 2010a). Overall, it has been estimated that 
in countries where Islam prevails, consanguineous marriages generally account for 
between 20%-50% of all marriages (Bittles et al. 1991, Bittles 1994), although any 
causal link between Islam/Islamisation and consanguinity has been strongly contested 
(e.g., Korotayev 2000). Indeed, between 20%–45% of unions in South India, where 
Hinduism prevails, are between blood relatives while a similar trend, driven by 
sociocultural customs, has been identified among some communities in West and South 
Asia, such as Buddhists, Christians, Jews, Parsees, and Druze (Bittles et al. 1991, 
Bittles 1994). Bittles and Black (2010a) estimate that 10.4% of the global population (in 
2010) is related as second cousins or closer (F≥0.0156). 
Beyond geography, Bittles and Black (2010b) identify a number of demographic 
and social correlates of consanguinity, namely rural residence, more traditional 
lifestyle, lower socioeconomic status, family tradition of consanguineous marriage, low 
level of maternal education, younger maternal and paternal ages at marriage and lower 
spousal age differences, younger maternal age at first birth, shorter birth intervals, 
extended maternal reproductive spans, and larger completed family sizes.  
While first-cousin marriages are the most common form of such marriages, there is 
an important difference between „cross-cousin‟ and „parallel cousin‟ or „ortho-cousin‟ 
marriages. A  'cross-cousin' is the child of the mother‟s brother or of the father‟s sister, 
while a 'parallel-cousin' is the child of the father‟s brother or the mother‟s sister (see 
Murphy and Kasdan 1959, Ember and Ember 1988). Globally, it has been suggested 
that the majority of consanguineous marriages are, in fact, „cross-cousin‟ marriages. 
Indeed, Korotayev (2000:395) observes that the “overwhelming majority of cross-
cousin marriages appear among the Islamic cultures of North Africa, and those of West 
and Central Asia”. The crucial difference between the two forms of marriage is that in 
exogamous unilineal descent groups, parallel cousins belong to one‟s own descent 
group, while cross cousins do not. Some scholars argue maintenance of property rights 
is just one manifestation of an event that symbolises a more general sense of a 
„solidarity‟ with one‟s father‟s lineage (e.g., Holy 1989), although such simple 
interpretations have been questioned (e.g., Ahmed 1990). Furthermore, of these 
parallel-cousin marriages, „paternal parallel‟ marriages, or marriage to the father‟s 
brother‟s daughter, are indeed the predominant form of consanguineous union.4  
As Table 1 indicates, within contemporary Arab countries „paternal parallel‟ 
marriages represent the predominant form of consanguineous union. However, 
important differences can be observed between both countries and socio-economic 
                                                          
4 Such marriages are also known as „preferential partrilateral parallel cousin marriage‟, „Type I‟, and „FBD‟ 
marriages. In Arabic, such weddings are known as ‘Bint amm’. 
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groups. In a 2004 study of consanguineous marriages in Sana‟a (Yemen), for example, 
where the total incidence of consanguinity was 45% with 72% being first-cousin 
marriages, such „paternal parallel‟ marriages accounted for only 49% of the total, with 
cross-cousin marriages accounting for a further 33% (Gunaid, Hummad, and Tamim 
2004). Similarly, in Beirut, a 1984 study by Klat and Khudr observed that while 
consanguineous – mainly first-cousin – marriages are frequent, the preference for 
„paternal parallel‟ marriages was, indeed, declining. On the other hand, numerous 
studies have identified extremely high levels of paternal parallel marriages among 
lower income, rural, and Bedouin tribal communities (Khlat et al. 1986; Radovanovic, 
Shah, and Behbehani 1999; Raz and Atar 2004).   
 
 
Table 1: Preferred patterns of first cousin marriage in different Arab 
societies, developed and elaborated from Bittles and Hamamy 2010 
Country Parallel-cousin (%) Cross-cousin (%) All first 
cousin 
unions (%) 
Source 
Paternal
a
 Maternal
b
 Paternal
c
 Maternal
d
 
 
 
Lebanon 37.4 22.5 10.4 29.7 14.1 Khlat 1985 
Jordan 
62.8 9.9 7.7 11.3 32.0 
Khoury and 
Massad 1992 
UAE 
64.9 8.4 12.2 14.5 26.2 
Al-Gazali et 
al. 1997 
Israel 
48.2 20.3 13.5 17.7 24.3 
Jaber et al. 
2000 
Yemen 
48.9 18.1 14.2 18.8 29.4 
Gunaid et al. 
2004 
Qatar 
36.8 21.1 14.2 26.8 34.8 
Bener and 
Alali 2004 
Palestinian 
Territories 47.9 17.6 20.1 14.4 14.4 
Assaf and 
Khawaja 
2009 
 
Notes:  
a Father’s brother’s sister, F=0.0625 
b Mother’s sister’s daughter, F=0.0625 
c Father’s sister’s daughter, F=0.0625  
d Mother’s brother’s daughter, F=0.0625 
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Of course, consanguinity needs to be sited in a wide array of family demographic 
systems within which it has an important interplay. Consanguinity and polygyny have 
traditionally co-existed in a number of populations, although the prevalence of the latter 
has often been exaggerated (Chamie 1986). For example, prevalence rates in North 
Africa, Palestine, and Syria are between 3%-5% (Tabutin and Schoumaker 2005), while 
in some sub-Saharan groups levels of polygyny can range between 20%-50% (Timaeus 
and Reynar 1998). However, the theoretical relationship between fertility change and 
polygynous marriage has primarily been considered at the micro-level, i.e., changing 
fertility levels by marriage order within relationships, rather than fertility at the 
population level. Cahu et al. (2011), however, find that women in polgynous 
relationships tend to exhibit lower lifetime fertility than those in monogamous 
relationships. 
 
 
1.2 Recent trends in consanguinity 
Globally, rates of consanguinity are declining, with marked reductions in more 
industrialised countries – coupled, of course, with the combined proscription and 
demographic conditions in China, which clearly affect global prevalence rates. 
However, in some countries the present-day rates are, in fact, higher than those of the 
preceding generation. In Qatar, to take one example, prevalence rates for 
consanguineous marriages are higher among the current generation compared to their 
parents, particularly regarding double ﬁrst cousin (3.1% versus 1.2%) and ﬁrst cousin 
marriages (34.8% versus 26.7%) (Bener and Alali 2006).  
Three discrete sets of mechanisms have been identified to highlight the appeal of 
consanguineous marriage across the greater Middle East (Weinreb 2008). Firstly, 
women in consanguineous unions are better able to assert a superior kinship position: 
unlike exogamous wives who can be more easily divorced and whose children more 
explicitly belong to their husband‟s family (Tillion 1983, Mernissi 1987), endogamous 
wives have a larger local support network and are better able to take advantage of 
„kinship solidarity‟ (Abu-Lughod 1986, Davis 1983). Secondly, in patrilineal marriages 
property remains within the lineage – a feature especially important in rural 
communities (Bittles and Black 2010b). Thirdly, the initial bridal payment is generally 
lower (Dahl 1997). Finally, endogamous marriages are “expressive acts (that) make 
pronouncements about the value of kinship of solidarity” (Holy 1989, p. 114). These 
cultural factors might relate to trust and familial loyalty, the purity of the bloodline, 
and, at a clan level, the security of the group (Schultz and Lavenda 2000). As Bittles 
(2003) observes, for impoverished rural areas characterised by low levels of maternal 
education, early age at marriage and first birth, short birth intervals, and longer 
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reproductive spans, the socioeconomic benefits of consanguineous marriage often 
outweigh the biological disadvantages. 
Finally, a body of literature in political and social science has called attention to 
other issues, including the so-called „republic of cousins‟ where the interests of the 
extended family or group outweigh the state or other economic enterprises (Tillion 
1983). Given the often high degrees of political uncertainty in many areas where cousin 
marriage is high, this „retreat‟ to the kin group could be a rational response. 
It is, however, crucial to set apart underlying preferences for cousin marriage as 
determined by the social, economic, and cultural factors set out above from the 
demographic conditions to actualise such a marriage. Indeed, Bittles and Black (2010, 
p. 1780a) observe that the increased overall prevalence rates in many settings “possibly 
reflect greater overall survival to adulthood that in turn increases the numbers of 
marriageable biological relatives”. Net population growth among the age groups 
considered to be of „marriageable age‟ has been quite striking over the past few decades 
as a result of such countries travelling through the first phases of the Demographic 
Transition (e.g., Rashad 2000). As such, this combination of underlying preferences and 
favourable demographic conditions can act as a suitable background for the kind of 
high rates of consanguinity currently visible in many countries in the Middle East and 
North Africa [hereafter the „MENA region‟] and beyond. 
Weinreb (2008) has suggested that perhaps the most important factor in shaping 
future trends of cousin marriage is the general decline of fertility. Even traditional 
societies where consanguinity is common have witnessed a marked, and in some cases 
dramatic, decline in fertility in the recent past. That this development diminishes the 
pool of cousins is obvious. More difficult to intuit is just how quickly the constraints 
tighten.  
In this paper, therefore, we attempt to examine this question of demographic 
constraints on the future of consanguineous marriage – with an emphasis on the 
predominant form of paternal parallel marriages – in the context of generally falling 
fertility rates in countries where such marriages predominate. We tackle this issue 
through a series of simulation exercises using the 2010 United Nations World 
Population Prospects. It is important to emphasise, however, that this paper is primarily 
concerned with the demographic context, or, more precisely, is trying to estimate the 
extent to which there will be constraints to consanguineous marriage driven by falling 
fertility rates. In the following section, therefore, we outline the methods and the 
models used, followed by a presentation of the analysis and results in Section 3. In 
Section 4 we attempt to interpret the findings in the context of the implications such 
constraints could have on future trends of consanguinity.  
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2. Methods 
2.1 Baseline distribution 
The baseline distribution of (inclusive) sibship size is modelled as a Poisson count of 
the given mean. While this is standard for modelling birth parity, it is less clear that this 
is appropriate for the number of surviving children. To ensure robust conclusions we 
therefore tested two extreme alternative specifications. In the first, for a given mean 
child count n, all simulated child counts are fixed at n. In the second, they follow a 
uniform discrete distribution on [0, 2 n]. While the mean number of cousins is indeed 
affected to some degree by the choice of distribution, the more relevant implied 
measures of individual probability of having no male cousin and the maximal aggregate 
share of females matchable to a cousin are affected very little by the choice of 
distribution, and less than the variation induced by the other changes to the model 
specification discussed below. Only at very low child counts does the fixed count 
model deviate starkly from the Poisson model. However, this is clearly a statistical 
artefact, because at a fixed child count of one there are always zero aunts and uncles, 
and therefore zero cousins. Accordingly, we proceed with a Poisson baseline, which is 
subjected to substantively more meaningful sensitivity analyses, as described below. 
For the simple Poisson case, the average number of cousins (all and male only) can 
be calculated analytically. For a randomly sampled individual, the expected (inclusive) 
sibship size is equal to n+1, where n is the mean number of children. If the number of 
children were constant (and uncorrelated!) across two generations, a random member of 
the child generation would have an average of 2 n maternal and paternal aunts and 
uncles, who are parents to 2 n^2 cousins, of which an average of n^2 would be of the 
opposite sex (here the sex ratio is assumed to be balanced) and (n^2)/2 would be 
parallel paternal cousins of the opposite sex. While we do not pursue the analytic 
approach further, since it does not allow for the interaction of the sensitivity tests below 
and does not provide any answer to the question of maximal matchable share (and 
finally because, as Le Bras notes (1973, p. 12), if in any case we need to solve the 
integrals of the complete analytic solution through simulation we might as well 
simulate the phenomenon of interest directly), it serves as a check on the baseline 
simulation. 
 
 
2.2 Model specification adjustments 
The overall strategy is to examine variation in the outcomes induced by varying the 
model specification at a given average number of children. Accordingly, where ranges 
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are indicated in the figures below these are not stochastic confidence intervals, but 
indicate the range of values across the different model specifications where each value 
is a mean across simulation runs for a given model. 
 
 
2.3 Sex ratio 
The (tertiary) sex ratio is varied across the values of 45%, 50%, and 55% male, where 
these probabilities are applied independently to simulated children (a stopping rule is 
modelled independently, see below). In terms of the more conventional sex-ratio 
measure of x males per 100 females, these correspond approximately to values of x=82, 
100, and 122. This represents a fairly extreme spread. In particular it greatly exceeds 
the range observed (for secondary sex ratios) at the national level in the countries in 
which consanguinity is widespread, in order to guarantee coverage of the sex ratios that 
may characterise the specific sub-populations which practise cousin marriage, and to 
allow for further distortions due to differential infant and child mortality. Since 
ultimately we are interested in characterising the relationship between consanguinity 
constraints and declining fertility, migration-induced distortions to the sex ratio are of 
little interest here. 
 
 
2.4 Son preference stopping rule 
Sex-selective abortion may not be available or socially acceptable even in the presence 
of a strong son preference. Indeed, the sex ratios at birth among the countries with the 
highest prevalence of cousin marriage are unremarkable. It is therefore necessary to 
also account for son preference that manifests itself in the form of a stopping rule. In 
other words, to model a behavioural pattern where those couples who do have children 
do not stop in their parity progression before they have had at least one son. In order to 
generate such child distributions at a given mean child count, the initial segment of 
daughters (which might be zero) is modelled as a geometric distribution, and, following 
the addition of the first son, a Poisson-distributed number of births (of independent sex) 
is added, where the mean of the Poisson distribution is chosen to bring the overall mean 
up to the given level. 
It may seem as if this model only works if the overall mean number of children is 
greater than or equal to two, because in the simplest case the mean number of initial 
daughters is one, so the initial daughters together with the first son already lead to a 
mean of two. However, as can be seen below, this is no longer the case when the degree 
of childlessness is varied. While this model is not perfect in that it does not allow, as an 
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example, for couples who have several daughters but ultimately never have a son this is 
arguably extreme since in reality son preference is unlikely to be this absolute and 
universal. As such, it arguably provides an indication of the amount of variation that 
may, at most, be expected to be contributed by son preference (or indeed, by non-iid
5
 
births more generally). 
 
 
2.5 Childlessness 
The proportion childless generated by the Poisson distribution is scaled up or down 
proportionally by factors 1.5 (high), 1 (default), and 0.5 (low), respectively. The non-
zero child counts are then drawn from a zero-truncated Poisson distribution with a 
suitably scaled mean to maintain the same overall mean across all levels of 
childlessness. 
 
 
2.6 Correlated sibling fertility 
By default, child counts are drawn independently for siblings in the parent generation. 
An extreme alternative scenario is also simulated where child counts are perfectly 
correlated among siblings. In other words, all aunts and uncles have the same number of 
children (and the same as ego‟s parents). Even though this is extreme it hardly affects 
the results, suggesting that more elaborate correlation models are unlikely to change the 
conclusions. A possible correlation between the child count for the grandparents‟ and 
parents‟ generations is ignored for the reason that we want to be able to set both 
generations‟ average number of children independently, which rules out the extreme 
bounding case of perfect correlation across generations. A possible extension would 
consist of using a bivariate Poisson distribution, but this option is not pursued here, 
given the overall robustness of the results to the distributional specifications already 
tested. 
 
 
2.7 Selectivity 
While the above specification parameters affect the „hard‟ structure of cousinships, 
from the perspective of union formation it is clear that – even disregarding the question 
of competition and which cousins are already married to someone else – the total 
                                                          
5 Independent identically distributed 
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number of cousins of the opposite sex is an overestimate of the number of potential 
matches. Even in settings where marriages are socially arranged, and even if the bride 
had no autonomous say in the decision, not every dyad of female and male cousins 
would be considered eligible. The age differential might be considered inappropriate, 
and, more specifically, there may be a strong preference for the groom to be older than 
the bride. This alone cuts the number of „eligible‟ cousins in half, on average.6 The 
male cousin may be unattractive to the potential in-laws for any number of reasons, and 
there may be some tension between the parents of the cousins. Finally, some cousins 
may, in fact, be „milk siblings‟, or breastfed by the same woman – a common practice 
in many developing countries (Parkes 2005). Under these circumstances they may not 
be allowed to marry. 
Here, we consider scenarios where a given female-male dyad of cousins is 
considered „eligible‟ with probability 1 (no selection), 50%, or 25%. Arguably, even the 
latter is generous, especially if any kind of agency is assumed on the part of the 
potential bride. As a result all of these parameters are argued to provide conservative 
estimates of the constraint on consanguinity, and the “no selection” case a hard upper 
bound. 
 
 
3. Analysis and results 
3.1 Overall relationship between fertility and pool of male cousins 
As can already be deduced from the analytic formula for the simple Poisson case, there 
is an order-of-magnitude decline from dozens to a handful in the mean number of 
cousins of the opposite sex a random female is expected to have, as the average number 
of number of surviving children declines from above six (a number not uncommon in 
the parent generation in the region, and in Yemen in particular) to less than two (a level 
already reached by Iran and the UAE and projected to be reached even by Egypt and 
Jordan within a generation). This is shown in Figure 2, together with the range resulting 
from the different combinations of model specification outlined above. This model 
variation is modest compared to the differences by adult sibship size. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 This is not true in the case of cross cousins. Given that females tend to marry at a younger age than males, 
the father's sister's sons would, on average, be older than a female ego, while her mother's brother's sons 
would tend to be younger. 
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Figure 2: Average number of male cousins to a random female as a function of 
average adult sibship size 
 
Note: shading indicates range of model-specification induced variation. 
 
 
The change in the mean number of cousins does not, by itself, necessarily amount 
to a constraint on cousin marriage, even if it does provide an important sense of the 
scale of the structural change. The question is whether the diminishing choice pool of 
male cousins or the diminishing competition from female cousins dominates. We 
therefore focus our attention on two other simulation outcomes: firstly from an 
individual perspective, the probability of a random female having no male cousins of 
the specified type, in which case the question of competition does not arise; secondly 
from an aggregate perspective, the maximal share of women who could be matched to a 
male cousin. These two measures are not symmetric opposites: while those without 
male cousins certainly cannot be matched, the reverse need not be true. Among five 
sisters with a single male cousin, none of them has no male cousin, but at most one-in-
five of them can be matched. 
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3.2 Probabilities of no male cousin 
The probabilities of having no eligible cousin of the specified type from the perspective 
of a random female are displayed in Figure 3. These probabilities cannot be derived 
from the mean counts in Figure 2 alone because the variation around the mean does 
matter, as does the distributional effects of different model specifications. 
 
 
Figure 3: Probability of having no male cousin as a function of average adult 
sibship size, by selectivity (horizontal panels) and cousin type 
(vertical panels) 
 
 
Note: shading indicates range of model-specification induced variation. 
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Recall the meaning of the “selectivity” parameter, which is constant along columns 
of sub-graphs. Panels (a-c) in Figure 3 correspond to the probability of having any male 
cousin of the specified type at all, without regard to any other factor. It is therefore a 
highly conservative estimate of the share of women without any suitable cousin. Alone 
the imposition of an age preference in favour of matching an older groom with a 
younger bride moves us to the central column, where the estimates are appreciably 
higher. Allowing, in addition, even for nominal choice on the part of the female (in 
other words, ensuring she has a choice between at least two candidates, moving us to 
the right column) greatly increases the share further. 
These results suggest that, even disregarding competition (which we turn to next), 
the most particular types of consanguineous marriage, specifically parallel paternal 
cousin marriage, is a non-option for a large majority of females once the average 
number of children drops to two or below, as long as any allowance at all is made for 
the fact that not any and every male cousin is actually a suitable match – panel (i). Even 
insisting on the only choice could affect at most about half of women at this level of 
reproduction, with the other half simply having no male parallel paternal cousin – panel 
(c). The same is true when a semblance of choice is maintained, but the pool expanded 
to all first cousins – panel (g). At the other end of the spectrum, it is evident that this 
particular constraint (of no option of a suitable cousin) all but disappears if preferences 
regarding the specific type of cousin and his relative age are relaxed and female choice 
neglected entirely – panel (a). We can also see that at high levels of reproduction this 
constraint is negligible, even under more restrictive assumptions. 
We note that, especially for paternal and parallel paternal cousins and for more 
stringent selectivity, the baseline model provides a conservative estimate, in that most 
changes to the model specification lead to a greater proportion of women without the 
specified type of cousin. In particular, this is true when son preference is introduced. 
 
 
3.3 Matching 
The preceding section analysed the share of women who are not exposed to the 
possibility of cousin marriage on account of not having any male cousins to begin with. 
Of course, even if a woman does have one or more male cousins, none of them might 
be „eligible‟. An important factor that makes a cousin ineligible as a partner is simply 
that he might already be married. 
A separate question is therefore what overall share of woman can be matched 
within a given cousin network. In particular, we estimate the absolute maximum for this 
share through optimisation (see the technical Appendix for details). 
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This maximisation is computationally intensive, and only feasible on closed 
networks of cousins. Parallel paternal cousinships are naturally closed, because the 
relationship is symmetric and transitive. If you are my parallel paternal cousin then I am 
yours, and your parallel paternal cousins are mine, and vice versa. Paternal cousinships 
alone and a fortiori paternal and maternal mixed cousinships are not closed in this way. 
In order to perform the maximisation they are therefore restricted to the pool of 
grandchildren of a single pair of grandparents. 
Maximisation requires a single locus of decision-making. It therefore seems 
plausible that the theoretical maximum may be an overestimate of the maximum share 
that could actually occur in reality. To investigate this further we compare the maximal 
share with the share resulting from random matching within the network. In other 
words, this still assumes an overriding preference for seeking a match within the 
network, but matches are made locally without following an overall „global strategy‟. 
This raises the question of what constitutes a „random‟ match. Of course, in numerous 
settings (such as some MENA countries), some women marry within clan or tribal 
groups so the context of a truly „random match‟ in real life is somewhat diminished. 
However, within cousin networks at least two straightforward interpretations suggest 
themselves. The first amounts to selecting a match uniformly at random from the set of 
all potential matches. The second consists of selecting a female uniformly at random, 
and then one of her available matches (if any; if she has no options, start again). 
Equivalently, the question is whether sampling the female to match next should be 
weighted by her number of available matches or not. Neither is self-evidently more 
plausible than the other. While a greater number of options may indeed be seen as 
implying a greater chance that one of them is realised in a given period of time there is 
also a sequential mechanism in operation, because the female cousins do not all reach 
marriageable age at the same time, but in essentially random order. A priori, one would 
expect the unweighted randomisation to yield outcomes closer to maximal, because a 
heuristic optimisation strategy would be to match those with fewer options first, not 
those with the greatest number of options. This is indeed borne out by the results. 
However, more striking is the fact that either randomised approach reaches levels fairly 
close to the maximum (cf. Figure 4). 
 
 
  
Barakat & Basten: Modelling the constraints on consanguineous marriage when fertility declines 
292  http://www.demographic-research.org 
Figure 4: Maximal share of females matchable to a male cousin as a function of 
average adult sibship size, by selectivity, and matching strategy 
 
 
 
This has both methodological and substantive implications. In terms of 
methodology, it means that even though optimisation is not feasible on an „open‟ 
network of maternal and paternal cousinships, randomisation by contrast may be 
feasible. More importantly, it means that the maximal matchable share does not greatly 
overestimate the realistic upper bound, since getting close to it does not require a 
hypothetical centralised matchmaking regime. It only requires that each family (or even 
individual) separately and independently exploits any opportunities within the 
cousinships examined here first, before turning to either the marriage market outside or 
other culturally accepted familial links such as cousins „removed‟ or second cousins. 
Turning to the present results, we can see that the simulated share of females that 
can at most be matched to a male cousin of the specified type declines strongly as the 
average adult sibship size decreases. If even modest selectivity is introduced it drops 
from almost 90% to 10% as the number of surviving children moves from seven to one, 
especially if the sex ratio is skewed towards males. Depending on the model 
specification the narrower move from four to two children precipitates a decline in the 
matchable share of between 20 to 40 percentage points. 
Inevitably, choice matters. Relaxing all restrictions other than that the partner is a 
male cousin, still half of all women (and more in the presence of male-biased sex ratios) 
would be matched to a cousin even at an average child count of two. But insisting on a 
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parallel paternal cousin lowers this bound considerably to a large minority, as does the 
introduction of even modest selectivity. 
The aggregate matching constraint can be seen to be tighter than the individual 
constraint discussed previously. Comparing panel (a) in Figure 3 with panel (b) in 
Figure 5, note that at a child count of two, fewer than one-in-ten women have no male 
cousin, but still just over half can be matched to one at the most. 
By making comparisons between the panels in Figure 5, we note that the sex ratio 
affects the results only at high child counts. Conversely, comparisons within rows show 
that selectivity matters much more at the low end than at the high, as well as affecting 
the gap between the maximal shares in general and parallel paternal cousin pools. 
Also note that, despite the fact that, on average, one quarter an individual‟s cousins 
are parallel paternal cousins, the curve for the parallel paternal matching pool and no 
selection does not correspond to the curve for all cousins with selectivity 0.25. This is 
because in the former case whole sibships are included or excluded, whereas in the 
latter case selection operates individually. 
An interesting fact is that increasing selectivity induces a sigmoidal shape in the 
case of parallel paternal cousin marriage. In other words, the most rapid change in the 
constraints occurs at medium levels of fertility decline, not at the lowest. 
The remaining variation indicated by the shaded areas is – for the parallel paternal 
cousin case, where it matters – mainly due to the inclusion or not of the son preference 
stopping rule in the model interacting with childlessness in a fashion elaborated in 
Figure 6. While even the strict son preference modelled here has very little effect on the 
maximum matchable share at high child counts, it greatly depresses the matchable share 
as the number of children drops to two. This is intuitively understandable, since the 
model implies that as the number of children among parents approaches two, the 
probability of brothers (whose children would be parallel paternal cousins) goes to zero. 
The interaction with childlessness confirms this, since lower childlessness at an overall 
mean child count of two implies the average child count among parents is closer to 2 
than it would be at high childlessness and an overall mean of two. In the high 
childlessness scenario the mean child count of parents greatly exceeds the overall mean 
across all adults. This is the reason why the stopping rule for parents (which requires a 
parental mean child count greater than, or equal to, two) is compatible with an overall 
mean child count of one. 
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Figure 5: Maximal share of females matchable to a male cousin as a function of 
average adult sibship size, by selectivity (horizontal panels),  
and tertiary sex ratio (vertical panels)  
 
 
Note: shading indicates range of model-specification induced variation. 
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Figure 6: Interaction of childlessness and son preference stopping rule on 
maximal share of females matchable to a male cousin as a function of 
average adult sibship size 
 
 
 
In sum, the decline in the maximal share of women who could theoretically be 
matched to a cousin shows that the diminishing options as the average number of 
children declines strongly outweigh the decreased competition. On the contrary, the fact 
that the decline cannot be mainly attributed to the increasing share of women with no 
cousin option shows that competition actually increases with declining child count – at 
least in a combinatorial sense. 
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3.4 Country case studies 
The above simulations assumed constant mean sibship size and structure between 
generations in order to characterise the constraints on consanguinity as a univariate 
function of the mean number of children. In real populations the mean sibship size of 
the parent and child generation may be very different. In order to examine the 
implications of this we also ran simulations that are calibrated to approximate empirical 
figures for specific countries. In particular, the average adult sibship size, in other 
words the average number of surviving children, is set to twice the net reproduction rate 
(NRR). We employ the NRR instead of the total fertility rate (TFR) in order to account 
for mortality. While the NRR is normally interpreted as indicating the number of female 
births a new born female would experience, taking her own mortality into account, in 
the synthetic cohort this is equivalent to the number of daughters a female at the start of 
childbearing age (and therefore conditional on having survived to that age) would have, 
who in turn survive to childbearing age. Accordingly, we take twice the NRR for the 
years 1980–1985 as a proxy for the average adult sibship size in the parent generation, 
that of 2005–2010 for the child generation (i.e., shaping marriage prospects 15–25 years 
from now), and that of 2030–2035 for the generation of the latter‟s children (using both 
the UN‟s medium and low projections). 7  This is, of course a relatively crude 
approximation, but the aim here is not to arrive at forecasts for these specific countries 
but to highlight the differences between divergent empirical patterns of fertility decline. 
The countries chosen are Egypt, with a steady decline in NRR; Iran, with a rapid 
decline taking it from a level above that in Egypt to one below; and Yemen, with a slow 
decline at high levels. The results are summarised in Table 2. The selectivity parameter 
is set at 50% (other than for the raw counts) to arrive at somewhat more realistic figures 
than the purely theoretical assumption that each and every cousin is an eligible match 
would imply. 
In Iran, despite the recent rapid fertility decline, when today‟s young children 
reach marriageable age there will be few demographic constraints on consanguineous 
unions. Up to half of all women could in principle still be married even to specifically a 
parallel paternal cousin, and more than two-thirds to any type of cousin (including but 
not limited to parallel paternal ones). The situation for their children is likely to be quite 
different. Around half of all females may have no eligible male paternal cousin at all, 
and those with at least one parallel paternal will only number about one-fifth and one-
seventh under the medium and low fertility scenarios respectively. Unsurprisingly then, 
                                                          
7 There has been significant discussion regarding the model used in the UN's 2010 World Population 
Prospects,, especially concerning the assumption that settings with below-replacement fertility at present 
would see an inexorable rise towards replacement by the end of the century (e.g. Basten 2013). For an 
alternative, expert-based, fertility assumption for Iran, see Basten et al. 2013). 
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fewer than one-fifth of females in that generation could be married to their parallel 
paternal cousin, even if this share were maximised. Even for first cousins of any type, 
the maximum matchable share may be less than a third (and less than one quarter in the 
low scenario), which is below some of the estimates for Iran‟s current actual share. 
In Yemen, by contrast, we see few if any hard constraints on cousin marriage of 
any type, even well into the future, and even taking projected fertility decline into 
account. Unless much stricter assumptions are made for the selectivity parameter the 
demographic constraints would make a marriage, even to a parallel paternal cousin, 
feasible for a large majority of women, even under the low fertility scenario. 
 
 
Table 2: Results of simulations calibrated to observed and projected NRR 
figures for Egypt, Iran, and Yemen 
 
UN 
fertility 
variant NRR 
Child generation Grandchild generation 
Opposite-
sex cousins 
(avg. count) 
[parallel 
paternal] 
Prob. 1+  
male 
cousin, 
selectivity 
0.5 (%) 
[parallel 
paternal] 
Maximum 
matchable, 
selectivity 
0.5 (%) 
[parallel 
paternal] 
Opposite-
sex cousins 
(avg. count) 
Prob. 1+ 
older male 
cousin, 
selectivity 
0.5 (%) 
[parallel 
paternal] 
Maximum 
matchable, 
selectivity 
0.5 (%) 
[parallel 
paternal] 
1980-
85 
2005-
10 
2030-
35 
Egypt 
med 2.1 1.34 1 
11.2 
[2.9] 
98 
[66] 
73 
[50] 
5.22 
[1.36] 
87 
[44] 
52 
[31] 
low . . 0.76 n.a. 
4.11 
[1.11] 
82 
[36] 
49 
[30] 
Iran 
med 2.73 0.82 0.65 
8.8 
[2.2] 
98 
[61] 
68 
[49] 
2.1 
[0.6] 
59 
[22] 
30 
[18] 
low . . 0.42 n.a. 
1.3 
[0.4] 
45 
[16] 
22 
[14] 
Yemen 
med 3.35 2.38 1.58 
31.8 
[8.0] 
100 
[91] 
86 
[74] 
15.1 
[3.7] 
99 
[74] 
78 
[59] 
low . . 1.34 n.a. 
12.6 
[3.2] 
99 
[70] 
74 
[58] 
 
 
Egypt falls somewhere in between. In the grandchild generation only a small 
minority of women would be expected to have no eligible cousin to begin with. The 
probability of being without parallel paternal cousin is much higher though, and a 
majority of women are expected to fall into this category, or even almost two-thirds of 
them under the low fertility scenario. Either way, up to half of all women could, in 
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principle, be married to a cousin even in the grandchild generation, and slightly less 
than a third specifically to a parallel paternal one. 
 
 
4. Discussion  
4.1 Is there any future for widespread consanguineous marriage? 
Our simulations have identified a strong link between fertility and the available pool of 
cousins to marry in a consanguineous setting. Given that fertility is declining rapidly in 
most countries where rates of cousin marriage are high, would it be fair to suggest that 
consanguineous marriages have a rather limited future as a significant marriage system 
in the „MENA region‟?  
Indeed, much of the literature on the subject tends to emphasise a number of 
changing cultural and societal norms, which seem to suggest that fertility decline could 
simply reinforce a qualitative shift away from consanguineous marriage. Many of these 
studies seem to be based upon some kind of overarching narrative of „modernisation‟ 
and development. Increased urbanisation, for example, has been cited as a possible 
factor in driving future declines. Improvements in female education may increase 
marital exogamy through an increased global view, individual empowerment and 
(financial) independence, and greater awareness of health risks associated with 
consanguinity. Some studies suggest that sexual attraction to outsiders as opposed to 
kin members is likely to be magnetised as a consequence of the increased sexualisation 
of Arab marital decisions – although this is far from clear (Pastner 1986). Assuming a 
degree of decision-making independence of bride and groom, this may also be 
increased by the traits of society associated with modernisation, which include changing 
preferences for the global/heterogeneous and greater exposure to strangers and the 
wider world (Jurdi and Saxena 2003). A further issue that is frequently cited in relation 
to a future decline of preference for consanguineous marriage is increasing awareness 
of the potential health implications.  
However, despite both the context of increased constraints derived from fertility 
decline and the literature cited above, there are also strong reasons to believe that the 
answer to our earlier question as to the extent to which consanguineous marriages might 
have a rather limited future as a significant marriage system in the „MENA region‟ 
could, in fact, be “no”. As stated in Section 1, for example, there are a number of 
reasons why consanguineous marriage can be an entirely rational response to prevailing 
socio-economic circumstances, irrespective of the tempo of such change. The 
demographic constraints are just that – „boundaries‟ created around the potential pool of 
mates from which such choices can be made. 
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In order to further demonstrate the extent to which a demographically 
deterministic view of future levels of cousin marriage is not ideal, we briefly turn to 
explore the historical experience of consanguineous marriage under relatively similar 
experiences of NRR.  
 
 
4.2 Consanguineous marriage in historical populations with similar NRRs 
The NRR in contemporary MENA countries is generally around the 1.2-1.5 mark. This 
is broadly similar to the rates seen for a number of countries in nineteenth-century 
Europe (e.g., Italy, Germany, Sweden, England: see Depoid 1941). While contemporary 
European populations demonstrate low levels of consanguineous marriage, in past 
populations estimates of such marriages have been higher. Our knowledge of such 
events is primarily based upon the comprehensive records of Roman Catholic marriage 
dispensations, although other studies calculated their prevalence from pedigrees and 
other records (see e.g. Day and Smith 2013). Overall, studies from Europe report 
generally low rates of consanguineous marriage at the population level. In early 
twentieth-century Brno, for example, rates were between 0.4%-4.7%, with a notable 
decline from 1930 to 1960 (Zahálková and Preis 1970).  
However, when other factors are taken into account such rates increase notably. 
Some studies identify the role of reproductive isolation in shaping consanguinity – for 
example Day and Smith (2013) for south-western England as well as Danubio et al. 
(2004), who identified rates of consanguineous marriage averaging 12% in nineteenth 
and early twentieth century L‟Aquila, Italy, with an increasing trend in the period 
1860–1930.  
More important, however, is the temporal shift in the later nineteenth century 
towards a “significant increase in inbreeding” in most Western European populations 
followed by a decrease in the twentieth century (Peña et al. 2002). The decrease is 
usually associated with broad changes in the economic and social structure of society 
brought about by inter-related processes of urbanisation, industrializsation, and the 
breakdown of isolates (Peña et al. 2002, Dahlberg 1929). However, explaining the rise 
of consanguinity in the nineteenth-century is far more controversial. Demographically 
speaking, relatively little change in NRRs can be detected across Europe over the 
course of the nineteenth-century, set, of course, against the backdrop of relatively 
muted baseline fertility and mortality (e.g., Depoid 1941). Despite this, Hajnal (1963) 
observed that falling death rates would indeed have contributed to higher rates of 
consanguineous marriage. Pettener (1985) explicitly identifies a link between 
inbreeding in the Upper Bologna Apennine with an increased survival in sibships. 
However, there is a raft of further contextual reasons that could explain why 
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consanguinity increased in this period. Indeed, the general causes put forward in the 
literature tend to relate to either legal developments or shifts in economic 
circumstances. Some studies, for example, cite the importance of changing regulations 
regarding property ownership and primogeniture (e.g., Moroni 1967, Morales 1992 in 
Peña et al. 2002), while others explicitly cite the relaxation of Catholic authorities‟ 
attitudes towards grant dispensations for cousin-marriage (Pettener 1985). Other studies 
within a psychoanalytic framework suggest that Victorians married cousins as 
surrogates for beloved nuclear family members, driven by strong unconsciously 
incestuous feelings (Anderson 1986). 
Crucially, however, a number of studies explicitly identify a particular cultural, 
social, or economic context – and some kind of secular shift within it – as the primary 
predictor of a secular increase (e.g., Jorde and Pitkänen 1991). For example, Bras, van 
Poppel, and Mandemakers (2009) argue that among the higher strata and farmers in 
later nineteenth-century Holland kin marriages were commonly practised and played an 
important role in the process of social class formation. This intimates that kin marriage 
“served to integrate families in strata of equal social standing during the process of 
industrialisation and the development of a capitalist market economy” (p.801). 
However, culture, demography, and geography again play a crucial role for Bras et al., 
given that the highest rates of consanguineous marriages occur among Orthodox 
Protestants in the Bible Belt of Holland and in the most isolated areas. For Victorian 
England, Kuper (2002) argues that “among the middle classes cousin marriage might 
counteract the division of land through inheritance, or avoid the necessity for very 
expensive marriage settlements” (p.179). Despite this, cousin marriage in most of these 
settings was never a mass phenomenon of the Demographic Transition. In Bras‟ (2009) 
study, for example, only 2% of the 1.1m marriages studied were between first cousins. 
Similarly, other features of the decline of cousin marriage beyond simple 
„development‟ through urbanisation and industrialisation as well as demographic 
constraints (e.g., Banks 1954) can be observed. This includes an increasingly vociferous 
public narrative around the perceived negative health consequences of cousin marriage, 
especially in the United States and United Kingdom (e.g., Ottenheimer 1990, Anderson 
1986, Bittles 2009). Furthermore, other structural factors such as the shift from land 
ownership to other types of moveable capital such as share investment and the 
subsequent effects on transmission have been identified as contributing factors (Kuper 
2002). 
In short, the historical experience from Europe strongly supports our hypothesis 
that demographic contexts might provide the setting for increased rates of 
consanguineous marriage, but other shifting cultural, social, economic, and political 
norms and narratives strongly contribute as well. However, the fact that even at the 
most demographically advantageous points within Transition consanguineous marriage 
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rates across historical Europe have been generally low (at the population level) suggests 
that what we are currently observing in the contemporary MENA countries (and 
beyond) is something of a novel phenomenon which should be addressed in its own 
right.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In our study we have attempted to identify and quantify the demographic constraints on 
consanguineous marriage – with a particular emphasis on parallel paternal marriages, 
the predominant form of such marriage in contemporary MENA countries. Previous 
studies have identified the role of changes in fertility and mortality patterns in shaping 
both the secular increase and decline – and projected further decline – of 
consanguineous marriage, but few have attempted to fully simulate such secular 
changes in an integrated manner.  
Our simulations suggest that, demographically, cousin marriage is effectively 
almost unconstrained at an average fertility of six children. At contemporary levels of 
fertility in MENA countries – namely of TFRs of around one to three children – the 
constraints are an order of magnitude higher. This observation holds true from both an 
individual and social perspective.
8
 As fertility levels are generally projected – and 
assumed – to decline over the coming decades, it is envisaged that such constraints on 
cousin marriage may only increase. The overall pattern appears robust to the details of 
the modelling assumptions. Furthermore, the baseline model provides a relatively 
conservative estimate of constraints. 
However, as we have argued throughout, this does not necessarily mean that 
observed prevalence will decline, particularly if current rates are well below current 
constraints. In some countries, however, current prevalence rates are indeed higher than 
the upper bound implied by their projected fertility decline. Even then a future decline 
in consanguineous marriage is not inevitable. Conceivably, a recognition of the implied 
constraints on consanguinity might - on the contrary - contribute to a stalled fertility 
decline. 
A further caveat is that the estimated prevalences quoted here are for percentages 
of marriage, whereas our estimated „matchable‟ shares are, in fact, percentages of 
women. Currently, in a state where marriage is near-universal this is of little 
importance. However, if patterns of marriage were to change markedly in the next few 
decades this could seriously affect the results of the model.  
                                                          
8 Although we do not address polygynous marriages in our model, it can be envisaged that a similar set of 
conclusions regarding constraints could be reached based upon both the number of available females and 
possible skewed sex ratios. 
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In conclusion, therefore, while our study has attempted to identify some of the 
demographic constraints on consanguineous marriage, prevalence rates will almost 
certainly rely on a much broader suite of economic, social, cultural, and political drivers 
and shifting norms. In turn, these drivers and norms will be as diverse and 
heterogeneous as the countries and cultures which practice widespread consanguineous 
marriage. While itinerant tribes in one country and the richest, urban communities in 
another may share similar rates of consanguineous marriage, the broader context as well 
as even the type of marriage will be extremely different. Demographic modelling alone 
cannot “tell us the ingenuity and flexibility through which social systems will cope with 
these changing circumstances” (Guilmoto 2011, p. 40). As such, future shifts in 
consanguinity rates will be conditioned by contextual variables, albeit within the 
context of tightening demographic constraints. 
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Appendix: Model specification and implementation details 
The simulations were run using the authors‟ custom code in the R language for 
statistical computing. The code is available from the authors on request. 
The basic model operates as follows. For a given mean child count, sibships are 
generated in the simplest case by sampling a sequence of Poisson length of binomials 
with independent gender probabilities. In other words, sibship size is distributed as sbs 
~ Poisson(mu.parents), with Binomial(sbs, r) sons, where mu.parents is the mean 
number of surviving children in the parent generation, and r the (tertiary) sex ratio. A 
total of sbs independent sibships are then generated in the child generation, with a mean 
of mu.children, and assigned to the siblings in the parent generation in random order. 
We thus obtain a single simulated „cousinship‟, which may be empty. A large set of 
such cousinships is generated; here, the number of replications in each case was 10,000, 
and the smoothness of the results suggests simulation variance in the mean estimates is 
minimal. The matching analysis uses this sample directly. For the analysis from the 
perspective of a random female individual, the cousinships can be re-sampled with 
sampling probabilities proportional to the number of females in the child generation, 
and then a single member of the parent generation is sampled with probabilities 
proportional to the number of daughters, whose daughters‟ perspective (which they 
share) is analysed. 
Adjustments to the basic model occur at the following points. Changes to the sex 
ratio affect the independent binomial gender assignment of individual children. 
Changes to childlessness and son preference lead to a redefinition of how a single 
sibship is generated (see below). The childless share under the baseline Poisson 
distribution with mean m is equal to cl = e^(-m). This share is multiplied by p in {0.5, 1, 
1.5} to give  l’ =  l p, and with this probability a zero count will be generated. The 
mean required of the truncated Poisson distribution is then m/(1- l’) and determined by 
an optimisation. As explained in the text, instead of a sampling a sequence of binomials 
of Poisson length, with independent gender probabilities, under the assumption of a son 
preference stopping rule, a geometric number of daughters is followed by a first son, 
and then a standard sequence of subsequent children as above with the appropriately 
reduced mean. 
Intra-family correlation determines whether, in the generation of a cousinship, the 
number of children is drawn independently for each sibling (in the parent generation), 
or whether the first draw fixes the number of children for all other siblings (i.e., perfect 
correlation of family size among siblings). 
Selectivity is applied as iid binomial assignments as to whether a cousin is counted 
(as „eligible‟) or not. Paternal and parallel paternal cousins are selected from the 
simulated overall cousin pool according to their definition. 
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The above model encodes some implicit simplifying assumptions not mentioned in 
the text. These include the assumption that individuals have one mother and one father 
each, in other words, re-partnering does not occur (and neither does polygyny), and 
consequently there are no half-siblings. The biggest simplification is to abstract away 
from age. Incorporating the age dimension would require dozens of additional 
parametric assumptions, including, but not limited to, marriage rates by age and gender, 
fertility by age or by marriage duration and birth interval, and acceptable age 
differences. Few of these have obvious default assumptions. In any case, the results 
would only be affected through ruling out potential matches due to the simulated age 
difference, but the most basic constraint of this type, namely insisting on an older 
groom, is readily approximated by the observation that this will be the case in 
approximately half the matches, and the effects can therefore already be seen in the 
generic selectivity parameter. 
The matching optimisation was performed by taking advantage of the equivalence 
to the Maximum Flow Problem by setting up a graph with individuals at the vertices 
and edges between eligible pairings, and connecting a virtual „source‟ to all females and 
a 'sink‟ to all males. The computations were performed using the graph.maxflow 
command in the igraph package. 
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